The article examines the failure to implement the 2014–2015 Minsk agreements which aimed to resolve the ongoing conflict in the Donbas region of Ukraine, and explains the reasons for their failure to achieve lasting peace. The author argues that the agreements were fundamentally flawed due to their lack of legal binding power, vague provisions, and the context of military dominance by Russian-backed separatists. The article details the discrepancies in the implementation of the ceasefire and local elections, alongside the manipulation of the agreements by Russia to legitimize the self-proclaimed republics. The military superiority of one of the parties on the front made it impossible to implement the agreements, and holding local elections without Kyiv’s consent undermined Ukraine’s sovereignty. The article underscores the necessity for a new approach to peace negotiations that considers the lessons learned from past failures, particularly in light of the recent escalation of hostilities in 2022.


The Minsk Agreements, negotiated between Ukraine, Russia, and international mediators France and Germany in 2014 and 2015, aimed to establish a ceasefire and restore peace in the conflict-ridden eastern regions of Ukraine. This article examines the failures of these agreements, which were intended to resolve hostilities following Russia’s invasion. Russian-backed militants frequently violated ceasefires, and Russia continued to portray Ukraine as the obstructive party, using the dissolution of the agreements as justification for its full-scale invasion in 2022. The analysis explores the pressures faced by Ukraine during negotiations, including the need for international support and military reinforcement. The implications of these historical negotiations are significant, as current Ukrainian leadership under President Volodymyr Zelensky emphasizes the necessity of robust security guarantees in any potential ceasefire discussions. The paper highlights the complexities and failures of the Minsk process, contributing to the understanding of contemporary geopolitical dynamics in the region.


This paper examines the lessons learned from the Minsk agreements between Ukraine, Russia, and the West, analysing their implications to resolve the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. The author emphasizes that the agreements were nominal, as Russia positioned itself as a mediator without making any commitments, and control over the Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained under its de facto administration. The agreements, while initially reducing violence, ultimately undermined Ukraine’s sovereignty and failed to establish a clear path to lasting peace, as evidenced by Russia’s subsequent actions leading to the full-scale invasion in 2022. The author claims that any future negotiations should recognize Russia’s direct involvement and uphold Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Western policymakers should foster a stronger military and political position for Ukraine, ensuring that any potential settlement is perceived as fair and legitimate by the Ukrainian people.